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French  interlocking  directorates  have  not  received  much  attention  until  recently  and  few
studies  exist  which put  them into an historical  perspective.  The prolific  school of French
business history has produced excellent  monographs,  but few syntheses and of these, few
based on quantitative evidence. However, French capitalism has been thoroughly discussed in
the business history and varieties  of capitalism literatures.  More generally,  as in  political
history, it is often presented as the archetype of statism – beginning either with Louis the 14 th,
Napoleon, or the post-World War II governments. This focus on the role of the State in the
economy often leads to the exclusion of France from other typologies of capitalism, especially
in studies contrasting Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland varieties (Hall and Soskice 2001). French
capitalism, revolving as it does around the State and family-led business groups (groupes),
and perhaps lacking real big business in most sectors or real entrepreneurs (Landes 1949), is
presumed not to have structures of its own. Its shape is seen solely as the product of external
forces, those of politics and/or relationships between elite families.
The narrative that we present here is based on a study of the interlocks between the largest
French firms listed on the Paris stock exchange from 1911 to 2000. It will not undermine the
role of the State or that of families.1 However, we will qualify more standard descriptions of
French  capitalism  in  two  ways.  First,  we  will  discuss  the  usual  understanding  of  the
chronological development of French capitalism, or rather the lack thereof, and secondly, we
will identify its underlying mechanisms. Our principal finding is that the general shape of the
network remained remarkably stable from 1911 (or even before) to 2000. It was, however,
subject to ebbs and flows, with two long periods of densification, each followed by moments
of disruption. It is impossible to make sense of both this enduring shape and these ebbs and
flows if one takes a simplistic view of the Napoleonic or socialist State, or the backward-
looking elite families. From the second half of the 19th century to the end of the 1930s, and
then from the post-WWII period to  the beginning of the 1990s,  the interlocking network
underwent  two  similar  phases  of  density  growth,  with  the  generation  of  many  multiple
interlocks between the largest French firms. Both of these periods were followed by a drastic
drop in density, first around the time of World War II, and then again in the 1990s. We will
see, however, that despite these impressive changes in density the generative mechanisms of
the  network  remained  the  same  by  and  large,  especially  with  regard  to  the  hierarchy
embedded within it. Two peculiarities of our dataset allow us to assert this. Firstly, we were
lucky enough to find a continuous source, which allowed us to use the same sampling and
coding schemes for all  dates adding weight to our longitudinal  comparisons.  It should be
noted  that  we are  only  looking at  firms  listed  on  the  Paris  stock  exchange  and that  our
definition of the largest firms is based on share capital. Secondly, our source and additional
research allowed us to systematically gather information on firms (their age, location, etc.), as
well  as  elements  on  the  trajectories  of  interlockers,  both  of  which  are  essential  for  our
interpretation. 
1 For  our  indicators,  sources,  and  methods,  including somes  results  that  were  specifically  produced  by our
methodology (e.g. tests of significance for homophily), see the Appendix and online appendices. Since Daumas
et  al.  (2010) provide a number  of  short  syntheses  and lists  of  references,  we often choose  to  refer  to  this
dictionary rather than to primary material in this chapter. 
2
In this  chapter,  we specify the mechanisms underlying this  tale  of French capitalism.  We
believe that, in order to properly understand the roles of the State and elite families, we must
see them as specific manifestations of three more general mechanisms. The first, and by far
the most important, is based on status, with interplay between the status hierarchies of firms
and that of directors. The network is organized around a core of high-status firms. Lower-
status firms are in the periphery of the network, but their directors do create some interlocks
with the core. In addition, the shared demand to have a small set of high-status directors on
various  boards creates  bridges  in the network.  The second mechanism is  one of  business
group building; interlocks forge local solidarity without resorting to mergers or cartels. The
third mechanism covers  governance practices and principles, which change over time and
influence  the  development  of  interlocks.  These  three  mechanisms  affect  each  firm
individually and also are likely to generate the emergent overall structure that we uncovered.
This  chapter  will  describe  the  shifts  that  took place  between 1911 and 2000 and present
hypotheses regarding their causes. We conclude by summarizing what we have learned about
the mechanisms that generate the enduring shape of this network.
1. 1911-37: A stable structure that survived war and crisis
The structure of the 1911-37 network is typical of that for the whole of the 20th century. Both
integrated and hierarchical, its integration relied on strong and increasing centralization. This
is  illustrated  by  the  30-40% of  seats  that  were  held  by  “big  linkers,”  for  example.  The
interlocking network looks like a ball of yarn,  with a disproportionately large core that is
much  denser  than  the  surrounding  layers.  The  inertia  of  this  structure  is  all  the  more
remarkable because it is not the product of political or economic stability.
Changing actors in a stable structure
First, this stable structure was not caused by inertia in our sample of firms, and certainly not
of directors. In contrast to smaller countries, Switzerland for example, we found significant
turnover with 57% of our 1928 firms not appearing in the 1911 sample and 36% of our 1937
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firms absent in the 1928 sample, just nine years prior. That the structure endures through such
change  implies  that  new firms  took  over  the  same structural  positions  occupied  by  their
predecessors at the previous observation point. Thus many things may have changed amongst
French firms and directors, but yet they interlocked in exactly the same way.
Second, this stability of the interlocking network occurred at a time of economic disruption.
World War I (with battlefields covering several of the most industrial regions) followed by
the economic crisis that took hold in France from 1932 onwards and which disrupted many
parts of the economy including the stock exchange. In addition, World War I led to new forms
of State involvement in the economy and in the collective organization of businessmen, with
the  creation  of the  peak  association Confédération  générale  de  la  production  française.
Lastly, a Socialist-led administration was in power from 1936-8, which, among other things,
brought the railways under the exclusive control of the State (Daumas et  al.  2010, 1287-
1300).
These events inevitably changed business practices in France and also impacted upon which
firms and individuals are found on the lists of the largest firms and interlockers. As a direct
consequence of World War I, the  Crédit national was created by special decree in 1919 in
order to handle war reparations and to lend money to industrial  SMEs. This new bank, a
private corporation closely linked to the State, made it into the top ten list in 1928 and was in
first position in 1937, with an outstanding degree of 72. It is noticeable that a small number of
newly created firms appear in the 1937 sample compared to that of 1928 or 1956 and this
probably reflects the economic crisis. Finally, our lists of big linkers highlight the new role of
business associations and think tanks. Two men appear in our top ten lists in both 1928 and
1937; both were political leaders among businessmen. Ernest Mercier (1878-1935, at the top
of both lists) created  Redressement français, a think tank promoting modernization through
planning.  Henri de Peyerimhoff  (1871-1953),  like Mercier,  was previously a high-ranking
civil  servant.  He  never became an executive but was the key man in the most  influential
business association, that of mechanical industries and mining (Beltran in Daumas et al. 2010,
468-70; Chatriot ibid., 543-5).
The French economy underwent major changes throughout this period, which can be observed
in our results. Once again, this makes the overall stability of the whole network even more
striking. The long-lasting structure emerged quite early on. Exploratory evidence on previous
observation  dates  (1840,  1857,  and  1883,  based  on  samples  of  120  firms  (François  and
Lemercier  2012))  shows  that  it  coalesced  in  the  mid-19th century,  even  before  general
incorporation laws. Thus French firms started the process of interlocking directorates much
earlier than others. Most studies of other countries describe this process as beginning only
around 1900 (Carroll and Sapinski 2011, 181). This happened at a time when the role of
boards was not well-defined and new businesses tried to attract investors by putting high-
status names on their boards. The shape of the network that emerged at that time survived the
loss of an industrial region to Germany, several financial crises, the legalization of business
associations in 1884, the birth of new (e.g. automobile and electricity) industries, as well as a
world war and a global economic crisis. 
4
The logic of status 
Two primary mechanisms might explain how the network developed into such an integrated,
hierarchical, and stable shape. The first concerns what we call, after Podolny (2005), status
logic. According to Podolny, the status of an actor relies on the links he or she has with other
actors: links to prestigious and powerful actors give access to part of their prestige and power;
links with more obscure actors, on the contrary, negatively affect status. In other words, in an
uncertain world, the actors to whom I am linked send a signal about my worth. Taking into
account  such  status  logic  makes  more  sense  of  the  structure  of  our  network  than  the
alternative mechanisms that are typically highlighted in the interlocking directorates literature,
such as the role of banks or the class-cohesion of the elite. Therefore, the French case helps to
develop an under-investigated part  of this literature,  alluded to by Mizruchi (1996) as the
“quest for legitimacy”: “By appointing individuals with ties to other important organizations,
the firm signals to potential  investors that it  is a legitimate enterprise worthy of support.”
(ibid: 276) In our case, the logic of status is at play both for firms (sharing a director with a
legitimate firm is important) and for the directors themselves (ostensibly having a director
whose personal trajectory brings them into the circle of the supposedly best and brightest is
important).
With  regard  to  firms,  positions  in  the  stable  and increasingly centralized  structure  of  the
network were not randomly distributed. Inertia was also striking in this respect; in each period
it is similar attributes that enable different firms to occupy similar positions in the network.
Indeed,  it  is  possible  to  extract  a  clear  status  hierarchy from our  data.  As  will  be  seen,
depending on the period, firms are seen to attain a high or low status on the basis of their
sector, level of share capital, location in Paris and/or seniority as listed firms with high share
capital. All of these elements apparently provide a form of legitimacy; they all denote a form
of closeness to economic and/or political power. Therefore an aggregate of these criteria is an
indicator of the status of each firm. This attribute is so highly correlated with positions in the
interlocking network that the shape of the network can almost be predicted using the status
indicator alone. In all cases, high status is correlated both with centrality in the network and
homophily  amongst  high-status  firms.  While  these  high  status  firms  preferred  to  share
directors between themselves, some lower-status firms did succeed in establishing interlocks
with them. In each cohort, a large number of firms have high status, as measured by at least
one or two of the criteria, which is why our network has a disproportionately large core, but
they were still clearly different from the lower-status firms in the periphery. This periphery
was not  made of  isolated  firms  or  small  components,  but  simply of  firms  with fewer or
weaker ties.
The status mechanism is well illustrated in the 1911-38 period. In the context of a highly
skewed distribution  of  share  capital,  firms  in  the  highest  quartile  had consistently  higher
average degrees (21 in 1938, compared to 11.1 for the lowest quartile). Firms without Parisian
headquarters always had a much lower average degree,  e.g. 11.4 in 1938, compared to 16.3
for Parisian firms. Finally, the centrality of firms already already present in the sample for the
previous observation point was consistently higher than that of newcomers, be they recently
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established firms, recently listed firms, or firms that had recently increased their share capital.
Parisian firms, large firms, and those that were large and had been listed for some time were
also significantly more homophilic than chance would allow.
The  economic  sector  in  which  firms  operated  was  involved  in  the  same  logic  of  status.
Between  1911 and 1937,  three  economic  sectors  were  both  highly  homophilic  and  more
central than others: finance, energy, and transportation/utilities. This was not entirely due to
differences in the location, size, or seniority of firms. Rather it indicates that in the first half of
the 20th century,  the core of  the French interlocking network was composed of a  mix  of
financial, transportation/utilities, and energy companies, with a tendency toward homophily
within each of these sectors and many ties between them. It seems that the firms in these
sectors  were sought  after  in  the same way that  large or Parisian firms  were;  as potential
sources of status signals based on interlocking. The fact that these firms were sought out by
lower-status companies, and that some succeeded in interlocking with them, created a very
integrated network; in the interwar period, more than 90% of firms were part of the main
component. 
How does this picture compare to classical descriptions of French capitalism? Firstly, with the
exception of  Crédit national, these high-status, central firms had no particular ties with the
State. From the firms’ perspective, the State does not seem to play a central role in shaping
the network prior to World War II. Secondly,  the existence of this core of big, persistent,
Parisian, financial and non-financial firms  qualifies traditional assumptions about feeble or
late French big business – along the lines of Cassis's own qualification (2008). Not only did
big listed firms exist, they were recognized as the center of developing French capitalism.
Status logic was not only at work for firms themselves, but also in their choice of directors.
Who connected high-status firms amongst themselves and with the periphery? The choice of
these  ‘network  specialists’  –  the  “big  linkers”  who  were  deemed  able  to  act  as  bridges
between competitors or economic sectors, for example – was far from random. They were
often the products of a well-known phenomenon in the sociology of the French elite;  the
continual  reproduction  of  this  elite  through  grandes  écoles (selective  higher  education
institutions), especially the  École Polytechnique and, from 1945 onwards, the ENA (École
nationale d’administration) (Bourdieu 1989; Maclean, Harvey, and Press 2006). Before the
founding of the ENA, civil servants with legal-economic backgrounds who worked in specific
offices and courts, primarily the  Conseil d'Etat and the  inspection des finances, played the
same structural role. These schools were originally founded in order to train top management
for public administration – especially that of the Financy ministrey,  as well as mining and
road and railway construction supervision.  Initially,  they produced a few dozen graduates
each year, a dozen of which entered the top  corps (special positions in the highest rank of
administrative personnel).  However, as early as the second half  of the 19 th century,  many
members of these  corps left public administration after a few years in order to join firms.
These moves from public administration to firms are called  pantouflage (Charle 1987). The
phenomenon is similar in some ways to the Japanese  amakaduri or the British tendency to
name former diplomats as board members (Colignon and Usui 2003; Maclean, Harvey, and
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Press 2006, 189). Yet it  is different because moves towards the French private  sector are
generally made early in a career, before the age of 40. Take, for example, André Benac (1858-
1937) who was a former ministerial staff member and senior officer in the Finance ministry.
He sat on the boards of many banks and railways and is in our top ten lists for both 1911 and
1928. His profile and career is similar to that of Gérard Mestrallet (1949-) who is in our 2000
list; a graduate of the Polytechnique and ENA whos also acted as chairman of the European
Roundtable of Industrialists. 
This connecting role of the pantoufleurs prompts a reassessment of the role of the State in our
network. Even though high status firms had no specific connections with the State before
World War II, the State did play a role in the status logic that we have outlined above; having
a  pantoufleur on  a  board  was  a  source  of  prestige.  This  does  not  imply  that  public
administration was implementing a deliberate policy aimed at implanting its own culture in
the private sector. The moves of  pantoufleurs were primarily due to individual and family
strategies within the elite, which can be observed at the beginning of the 20th as well as in the
21st century. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that some form of culture was
indeed exported from public administration to many firms; precisely what would depend upon
what was taught at elite schools and practiced in ministries.  However, this culture cannot
simply  be  characterized  as  ‘statist’.  More  important  for  French  interlocks  is  the  general
recognition of an elite of network specialists who create bridges in the network. Incidentally,
these  network  specialists  also  often  happen  to  have  begun  their  careers  in  public
administration,  which  contributed  to  their  reputation  of  political  influence  and/or  skills
applicable in all types of firms and sectors.
Strong ties inside business groups
The status mechanism described above is certainly the one that most shaped the structure of
the network. This mechanism does not work alone, however. It was combined with another,
which created  pockets  of  density  within  the  network  and  pushed  people  who  were  not
pantoufleurs and who performed bonding, not bridging, into our top ten lists. The overall
density and the prevalence of multiple interlocks (firms sharing two or more board members)
in the French network places it somewhere between the so-called Anglo-Saxon and Rhineland
models of capitalism. Its core-periphery structure differs from the latter, and it is also less
dense,  as  there  were  no  official  cartels  in  interwar  France,  even  though  cartels  and
corporatism were very much under discussion from the end of the 19th century until World
War II (Barjot in Daumas et al. 2010, 958-962; Denord ibid., 1018-1022). 
At a more local level, however, we find network structures that look like those of Rhineland
cartels, especially in the 1937 sample, which represents a high point in overall density. This
density was mostly due to a sharp increase (+48%) in the number of multiple interlocks from
1928 to 1937; in 1937, 76% of our firms had at least one multiple interlock with another. The
case  of  the  electricity  industry  shows  that  concentration  in  this  sector  was  achieved  not
through mergers, but rather by increasing both interlocks and ownership ties, which created
business groups of varying elasticity.  Such  groupes, often deemed typical of France in the
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1980s and 1990s (Swartz  1985),  in fact  began to thrive long before this.  Compared with
similar  business  groups  in  other  contexts  (Granovetter  1994),  interlocks  seem to  play  an
important role in French groupes, complementary to that of ownership ties. 
It was this kind of group-building logic that pushed Pierre Durand, Roger Durand, and Robert
Despres onto our list of top big linkers. They were all directors in the same six companies in
the hydro-electricity sector in various French regions. In most cases, Pierre was the executive
director  and  Roger  and  Robert  were  non-executive  directors.  All  three  were  engineers
(graduates of minor, non-elite schools). They were also, respectively, the son of, the son of a
cousin of and the son-in-law of the founder of the  groupe.  They were also very active in
business associations. If we look beyond our sample, in 1935 six members of their family held
84 positions  in French boards between them (Vuillermot 2000).  These were bonding, not
bridging, big linkers. 
Such groupes were used by some as a substitute for forbidden cartels in the quest for a more
coordinated capitalism; they created local solidarity between firms. This cannot be compared
to a pure merger, as the firms remained legally distinct and ownership bonds were often weak,
neither can it be compared to cartelization, since they did not create ‘coopetition’ in the entire
electricity  sector.  Groupes competed  with  each  other  and  were  only  linked  via  weaker,
generally unique interlocks provided by network specialists. 
2. 1937-90: Shocks and recovery of the network
After the war: a collapsed or weakened network?
Between our 1937 and 1956 observation points, changes in the French economy were even
more significant than between 1911 and 1937. The war and the German occupation disrupted
many economic sectors and many entrepreneurs were killed or expropriated. At the same time
political changes affected the list of the biggest French firms and their interactions with the
State.  In  the  post-war  period,  State-owned  monopolies  of  railways,  Parisian  public
transportation, coal mining, electricity and gas production and distribution replaced many of
the large old firms which played an important role at the core of the interlocking structure.
Most insurance companies became State-owned at  this time, as did a few large, symbolic
firms  such  as  the  Crédit  national,  the  central  bank,  the  largest  deposit  banks,  and  the
automobile manufacturer Renault (Chabanas and Vergeau 1996). 
These events not only changed our list of firms (although not more than between 1911 and
1928), but also the density and structure of the interlocks. This change, however, did not take
the form of a revolution, or of a collapse of the network. The 1956 structure looks very much
like  a  less  dense  copy of  the 1937 one,  with multiple  interlocks  being the main  missing
element. The overall density dropped by more than half, but the main patterns remained. Very
few firms were still excluded from the largest component, but many only had ties with one or
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two other companies. Only half of the firms still had multiple interlocks, and those that did
had fewer than before; the number of multiple interlocks was almost divided by three. Most of
the changes in the network were due either to the disruption of multiple interlocks or to the
increased scarcity of ties between the core of high-status firms and the periphery.
Why did the network keep the same general structure? And why did it weaken? The general
structure  endured  because  the  status  logic  continued  to  play  a  crucial  role  after  the  war.
Parisian firms, as well as those with the highest share capital, those that were already in the
1937 sample, and those in the most important sectors (finance and the mechanical and heavy
industries,  which  now  played  the  role  that  the  transportation/utilities  and  energy  sectors
played before the war), were still significantly more homophilic than chance would allow. On
average,  the largest firms, as well as those that were in the 1937 sample,  were also more
central. Lastly, even though the density of interlocks dropped among firms that stayed in the
sample from 1937 to 1956, it dropped less than that of the overall sample. Interlocks among
firms with the highest status in French capitalism remained largely in place, although even
they became scarcer. We do not claim that nothing happened as regards interlocks during the
war  and  the  post-war  period,  but  the  changes  that  occurred  produced  the  same  kind  of
structure that was in place before the war – albeit a weaker version. 
Prominent among the changes in the post-war period was the birth of a State-owned sector.
However,  this  did  not  create  a  new mechanism shaping  the  network:  State-owned  firms
followed on the pre-existing logics. The disappearance of private energy, transportation, and
utilities firms, especially of locally dense structures such as the Durand electricity  groupe,
played a role in the loss of density of the interlocking network, specifically in the disruption
of multiple interlocks. State-owned firms, however, took part in the reconstruction of a dense
and  centralized  structure,  as  they  exhibited  a  very  significant  homophily.  Their  average
degree  was  similar  to  that  of  the  sample,  but  with  important  internal  differences.  Crédit
national  was still the most connected French firm. Four other banks (including the Central
bank) and the national railway company were interlocked to between 10 and 20 other firms,
both public and private. Therefore the new State-owned sector did not give birth to a dual
structure of interlocks (public firms on one side, private on the other), but arguably was part
of an ongoing reconstruction of the previous shape of the network, as State-owned firms were
prominent among the new cohort of high status firms. 
Thus the status logic continued to play a role for firms after World War II, something also
true for directors. Between 1937 and 1956, there was a clear generational change, even though
few entrepreneurs were victims of political purges after 1945 (Joly in Daumas et al. 2010,
1317-21). However, even if some 1956 big linkers could be seen as new to the field, their
career profiles often remained rooted in the exact same status logic that dominated before the
war. Take Henri Lafond (1894-1963) as an example from our top ten list. He held no seat in
our 1937 sample and was part of the board of the State-owned electrical company in 1956,
nevertheless his career looks very much like that of pantoufleurs of the previous generations
(Joly in Daumas et al. 2010, 394-6). He was considered to be “the Pope of the  corps des
mines,”  one  of  the  most  prestigious  corps  of  Polytechnique graduates.  He  became  the
president  of  an investment  bank,  Banque de l'Union parisienne,  was in  charge of energy
under the Vichy government from 1940 to 1942, then active in the peak business association
9
after the war. He was an archetypical pantoufleur, but was not a friend of post-war Socialist
or Gaullist governments. 
In this way, status logic helps us understand why the structure of the network endured. But
why did it weaken, apart from the effect of State monopolies? The disruption of interlocks,
especially multiple ones, can be linked to changes in governance rules and practices that took
place between 1937 and 1956. A 1940 law limiting the number of board positions for the
same person to 8 threatened multiple interlocks, although this law was not always enforced
(Joly 2009).  More generally,  the accumulation of board positions  had been the subject of
growing criticism both within and without the business community in the 1930s. The ‘two
hundred families,’  ‘new feudal lords,’ and ‘trusts’ came under harsh criticism, which was
directed at the owners of the central bank and those who accumulated economic and political
positions and connections (Dard in Daumas et al. 2010, 1250-3).
This shift in social and then legal norms might explain the drop in the percentage of positions
held by big linkers and the fact that after it, our top ten big linkers then each held 6 to 9
positions  and  not  8  to  16  as  they  had  done.  This  was  also  the  time  of  the  slow
professionalization  of  the  role  of  board  members  and  of  the  président-directeur  général
(CEO),  the  single  top  executive  position,  which  was  becoming  more  common,  whereas
governance had been more collegial before the war. The time needed to adapt to these new
governance schemes and to figure out how to interlock in this new context might account both
for the diminished density of the network in 1956 and its new growth afterward. 
1957-1990: Back to the future
After getting shallower from 1937 to 1956, the network structure entered a new phase of
densification and centralization that led to features in 1979 and 1990 that are strikingly similar
to  those  of  1928.  These  processes  are  perhaps  counter-intuitive  given at  least  two major
changes that occurred during that time. First, a new economic crisis began just before 1979,
which led to the near-complete disappearance of some economic sectors. Second, the share of
heavy  industry  gradually  decreased,  while  that  of  consumer  goods  increased.  While
mechanical and electrical industries consistently represent one-fifth of our sample from 1956
to 2000, the shift in this period was initially towards electronics and, later, toward consulting
firms. Lastly, construction and real estate firms were especially prevalent in 1979 and 1990.
In this context, the turnover of firms in our sample is as high as before – ca. 60% for 20-year
intervals  and 40% for  10-year  intervals.  Second,  a  new Socialist-Communist  government
came to power in 1981 and brought a few dozen additional banks and a handful of industrial
firms under State control. Even though most of these companies were returned to the private
sector after the right won the elections of 1986 and 1993, our 1990 sample still includes the
most  State-owned  firms  (ca.  25).  Despite  these  changes,  however,  the  network  kept  its
structure and became denser after 1956, although our indicators never again reach the peaks
of 1937. It was as if, after a period of adaptation to the new governance structure and the new
State  monopolies,  French  capitalists  fully  returned  to  their  pre-war  logic;  purely  from a
network perspective, the 1979 and 1990 samples cannot be distinguished from that of 1928. 
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The mechanisms that explain this new long-lasting period of densification and centralization
are very much the same as those before World War II, especially the status logic. Between
1956 and 1990, the network continued to orbit around a large, dense center, surrounded by a
looser  periphery.  What  did  change slightly,  however,  was the  exact  list  of  attributes  that
defined the high status of a firm, with the changes observed in 1956 confirmed in both 1979
and 1990. State-owned firms were extremely homophilic, with an internal density of 16% to
18% in 1979 and 1990, as compared to 5% for the whole network – more than in any other
high-status class of firms. They were also extremely central in the network, not disconnected
in a separate component; their average degree was 17 to 19, as high as that of financial firms,
compared to 12 for the whole network. Being State-owned, however, did not subject the firms
to new mechanisms. This type of ownership was only one attribute of many high status firms,
the others still being an enduring presence among the largest listed firms, large share capital,
location in Paris, and activity in finance. 
The position of financial firms is worth discussing. In previous cohorts, they could always be
found in the core of the network; they were both central and homophilic. However, the 1979
and 1990 observation points are different in two respects. First, and contrary to the interwar
period,  no  sector  exhibited  the  same degree  of  homophily  and centrality  as  the  financial
sector. Construction and real estate were the exception in 1979, but in fact these firms can be
understood  as  close  to  the  financial  sector;  real  estate  companies  (with  profits  coming
primarily from rent) were often difficult to distinguish from leasing (crédit-bail) firms. 
The second difference was the activity of the financial sector. In the first half of the century,
there were many listed banks with large share capital, which played an important role in the
core of the network. This changes from 1956 onwards, however. In that year, we find only
approximately 20 banks in our sample,  15 in 1990 (half of them State-owned), and 10 in
2000. Mergers and acquisitions among the biggest banks created a dual structure, with smaller
investment/merchant banks playing a key role in French capitalism, and often in the careers of
our interlockers, but yet not appearing in our sample. What our samples do show, however, is
the part played, very early on, by institutional investors; portfolio companies, leasing firms,
etc. These represent a majority of our sample of financial firms from 1956 onwards. There
were only 5 to 12 of them prior to 1956, and in 1937, the 12 institutional investors had a mean
degree that was only modestly above average. well below that of banks. After 1956, however,
and especially in 1979 and 1990, our population includes dozens of institutional investors,
with  an average  degree  of  17.3 in  1979 and 15.7  in  1990,  very close  to  that  of  finance
generally. These firms have two distinct backgrounds. Some, such as La Hénin – founded in
the 19th century – were longstanding members of the financial sector, and some were recently
created  real  estate  firms  and  State-controlled  insurance  companies.  Others  had  moved  to
finance  from  declining  economic  sectors,  such  as  Pechelbronn  or  the  Compagnie  de
navigation  mixte,  or  from an agricultural,  commercial  or  industrial  activity  in  the  former
colonies.  The key role  played  by institutional  investors,  and finance  generally,  in  the  re-
densification and re-centralization of the French interlocking network from 1956 onwards
brings into question the standard narratives of financialization that describe it as an imported
phenomenon occurring in the 1980s or after.
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The return to the 1928 structure was based on the status logic, especially the role that State-
owned  and  financial  firms  played  within  it.  Along  with  companies’  preferences  for
interlocking with high-status firms and for pantoufleurs as bridging big linkers, we also find
local density and multiple interlocks based on the business group-building logic, just as we do
in the interwar period. The right-wing government that prepared State-owned firms for their
return to  the private  sector in the late  1980s deliberately strengthened this  mechanism. It
established  noyaux durs  (hard cores), i.e. complex webs of ownership ties and interlocking
directorates  that  were supposed to  protect  French firms  from foreign  influence  (Maclean,
Harvey, and Press 2006, 185-8).
3. 1990-2000 and beyond: Toward a dual French capitalism?
In the 10-year interval between 1990 and 2000, the network arguably changed more than it
did between 1937 and 1956. Spectacular changes in indicators, however, do not necessarily
imply that entirely new mechanisms are at play, as has already been seen in 1956. In fact,
some mechanisms simply seem to have become more radical. In the 1990s, the number of
multiple interlocks halved once again. In 2000, more than 10% of the firms have ties with
only  one  or  two  others,  just  like  in  1956,  but,  unlike  1956,  20% are  isolated,  which  is
completely new. The overall  density was thus halved, be it among financial  firms, among
non-financial  firms  or  between  financial  and  non-financial  firms.  However,  unlike  what
happened between 1937 and 1956, this loss in density was anything but homogeneous. Many
firms in the main component, and especially at its core, had more ties than before. If we focus
on firms that were present in both the 1990 and the 2000 samples, we actually find a modest
increase in density among them. In other words, the loss of density of the network was not a
symptom of the collapse of its core-periphery, status-based structure, but of its radicalization.
This  loss  of  density  engendered  a  dual  structure  with  a  more  isolated  periphery,  a
phenomenon that can be explained by the same status logic that played such an important role
throughout the 20th century. 
Changes in finance
The enduring features of the network core were exacerbated in 2000. The density of ties not
only remained high; homophily even increased in the case of State-owned firms, firms that
were already in the 1990 sample, and firms with the highest share capital. High-status firms
reinforced ties among themselves, while densities in the periphery,  e.g. among non-Parisian
firms or firms with a low share capital,  dropped to historic lows. The same was true for
average degree centrality, with no less than 9.6 for the handful of State-owned firms that are
still present, for example. 
What changed was the precise position of finance. In 2000, financial firms lost the striking
hegemony they had gained in the top centrality lists of 1979 and 1990. Accordingly,  their
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average centrality of 8.8 in 2000 was only modestly above the 6.6 sample average (but still
higher than that of any other sector). Homophily among them was still significantly higher
than chance would allow, but it produced a limited internal  density of 5.7%. This can be
explained in part by the presence of a very peculiar structure, that of the Bolloré  groupe,
created,  seemingly  in  the  best  interwar  tradition,  by  complicated  shareholding  and
interlocking bonds that united six firms of our sample into a quasi-clique of multiple ties.
These included former  colonial  companies  turned portfolio  firms,  like the  Compagnie  du
Cambodge or Caoutchoucs de Padang. 
Apart from this peculiar situation, we find few weak ties among financial firms, unlike all of
the previous observation points. Moreover, while the centrality of banks was slightly above
that  of  institutional  investors,  homophily  was  centered  on  the  latter;  ties  among  banks
produced  a  density  of  2.2%,  compared  to  6.6%  among  institutional  investors  and  4.5%
between banks and institutional investors. In 1990, the density among banks was 21.9% and
only 9.2% among institutional investors. It was institutional investors, therefore, that kept the
classical high-status position of the finance sector, while banks did not. The changing position
of banks can be linked first and foremost to a redefinition of their tasks. Until the 1980s, their
primary function was to directly provide firms with cash, and the control over the firm they
gained by sitting on the board was of tremendous importance. From the 1990s onwards, their
financing role was more embedded in market logic, and as such was more anonymous and
less  direct;  sitting  on  the  board  of  many firms  and  directly  controlling  them was  not  as
strategic as it used to be. Second, the position of banks also changed because of a decline in
their homophily, which appears to indicate new relationships between banks, with interlocks
no longer  mitigating  competition.  Until  the early 1990s,  the banking sector,  although not
explicitly organized along the logic of a cartel, was collectively regulated in such a way that
competitive dynamics were mitigated. The privatization of the banking sector and the gigantic
mergers that took place in the sector in the late 1990s put an end to this internal regulation.
After this, relationships between banks often turned into open warfare, such as the conflict
between  BNP and  Société  Générale  in  1999.  This  behavior  reduced,  if  not  quashed,  the
homophilic logics that had prevailed until then. 
A new, more isolated periphery
Despite these changes, high-status firms were generally still both homophilic and central in
the network. However, lower-status firms established fewer interlocks with them, producing a
more isolated periphery. To understand this shift, one has to keep in mind that the list of firms
with the highest share capital changed at a much faster pace than before. 60% of firms in our
2000 sample were not in the 1990 list, a change in 10 years that we only saw previously in 20-
year intervals. New firms came from the same broad sectors as before, with a slight increase
in the share of consumption goods, but in fact the nature of these firms is quite different.
Consulting and cleaning firms,  for example,  composed a  significant  part  of  our so-called
mechanical  sector (for  want  of  a  better  category),  and  new  activities  appeared  in  the
consumption  goods  sector:  hotels,  retailing  firms,  media  groups,  and  wines  and  spirits.
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Changes in the list of firms also exacerbated a tendency that had already been present since
1979: the inequalities in terms of share capital became huge. Between 1979 and 2000, the
minimum share capital in our sample dropped by 37%, while the maximum was multiplied by
7.8; the Gini index rose from 0.48 to 0.79. While mergers and acquisitions created huge firms,
companies with a different profile made their way into our sample and had an impact on the
structure of the network.
Two categories with little overlap are worth mentioning here: family firms and non-Parisian
firms.  The  former  includes  33 family  firms  (13%  of  the  sample),  if  we  use  a  rough
categorization whereby family firms are those that name an individual or (more frequently) a
family as their primary shareholder, whatever the percentage of shares held. Only one quarter
of them were present in the 1990 sample,  more than half produced consumer goods, their
median  share  capital  was  well  below  average,  and  their  average  degree  was  only  3.6,
compared to 6.6 for the whole network; they were part of the sparsely linked periphery of
lower-status firms. A good example is Grand Marnier, the famous producer of spirits, with
92% of its  sales abroad. Three families  each owned approx. 14% of the shares, with two
members of the main shareholding family on the board, one being its chairman; no interlock
with a firm in our sample was visible. The second category includes 46 firms in 2000 (18% of
the  sample):  their  headquarters  were  not  located  in  Paris  and they  were  not  in  the  1990
sample.  Only  6  were  also  family  firms  as  defined  above.  More  than  half  of  these  firms
produced consumer goods, their median share capital was below even that of family firms,
and so was their average degree (2.7). A good example is Skis Rossignol, the world leader in
ski equipment, created in 1907, with headquarters in the Alps and no interlock in our sample. 
Firms  with  the  same  profiles  existed  in  the  1990  population,  but  they  were  much  less
numerous. If we use the same definitions, there were 11 family firms and 17 newly sampled
non-Parisian firms. Even then, they tended already to have marginal positions in the network,
with average degrees of 10.5 and 7.4, as compared to 12.5 for the whole sample, but few were
completely isolated. 
Something completely new happened in the 1990s, such family and/or non-Parisian firms,
often  producing  consumption  goods  and  which  had  often  existed  for  decades,  suddenly
entered the stock exchange and/or dramatically increased their share capital, probably upon
turning to export markets and/or buying foreign firms. They did not try, or more plausibly did
not succeed, in choosing board members  that would have allowed them to interlock with
higher-status firms; the status logic excluded them from being connected to the center of the
network. In 2000, their collective arrival produced a dual structure. It makes observations of
French interlocks all the more sensitive to sample size. Studies that focus on the 40 firms
listed  in  the  top  stock  exchange  index,  which  is  often  the  case,  necessarily  exclude  the
disconnected  periphery.  With  a  sample  even  larger  than  our  own,  Windolf  (2002,  35-7)
identified  the  dual  structure  already  present  in  1997.  However,  he  interpreted  this  as
comprising two separate classes of firms: an integrated public sector and isolated, family-led
private firms criticizing State intervention. Our research provides a different account of this
dualization. While State-owned firms generally had a high status, most of the firms in the core
of the network were not under State control, and their directors generally did not advocate for
State intervention.
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Similar big linkers
The status logic can better explain the emergence of a dual structure. It also helps us gain a
sound understanding of how this new structure could be accompanied by inertia in the profile
of big linkers. In spite of the alleged internationalization of economic elites and changes in
governance  principles,  pantoufleurs continue  to  be  the  most  rewarded  directors  in  the
symbolic exchanges performed by interlocks. The status hierarchy was not upset by evolving
practices of governance, which predated the 2001 law forbidding the accumulation of more
than 5 board positions for one individual. Just as in the 1937-56 period, we observe a decrease
in average board size between 1990 (when it had returned to its interwar level of 12) and 2000
(10.4).  This  is  partly  due  to  the  presence  of  more  family  firms  with  smaller  boards  (8
members  on average)  but it  is,  first  and foremost, consistent  with discussions in business
associations  and think  tanks  criticizing  traditional  governance,  e.g. ‘reciprocal’  (multiple)
interlocks, and praising the model of the ‘independent director’ (Maclean, Harvey, and Press
2006,  76-80).  Triggered  by  international  comparisons  and  by  reports  presenting  new
governance guidelines,  e.g. the Viénot report in 1999, French firms nonetheless insisted on
the necessity to adapt without strictly following UK or US models. Our results indicate a
measure of success in this respect.
New governance guidelines probably played a role in the decrease in multiple interlocks. The
big  linkers,  however,  while  they  accumulated  fewer  positions  than  before  still  had  very
similar profiles. Unlike what happened in smaller European countries (see the chapters on the
Netherlands and Switzerland in this book), France did not see a massive arrival of foreign
directors.  An  exploratory  study of  interlockers  in  the  120  French  firms  with  the  highest
market capitalization in 2009 shows that they very much resembled those of 1957 and 1979; if
anything, pantoufleurs fared even better among them (François 2010). The status logic did not
involve new (or foreign) profiles. Three names appear both in the 1990 and in the 2000 top
list, including that of Ernest-Antoine Seillière, who was the heir of one of the oldest French
industrial families, a graduate of the ENA, had worked in several ministerial staffs, and was
president of the French peak business association from 1997 to 2005. As French elite schools
aim precisely to produce graduates who are considered and, moreover, consider themselves to
be excellent generalists floating above all interests and specialties (Bourdieu and Boltanski
1976), it is no wonder that changes in governance preferences that promoted the notion of
‘independent’ directors only reinforced their power as network specialists. While big linkers
were less numerous and held fewer positions than before, their careers seem to have become
even more standardized. Since these high-status directors tended to be associated with high-
status firms, they could survive the dualization of the network structure.
Conclusion
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We have recounted here a very French tale, which seems little influenced by external changes.
The low point in density in 1956 is not to be found elsewhere and seems to be related to
specifically French events (the creation of State monopolies) and processes (a change in views
on governance). Foreign institutional investors did not drive the French financialization of
1957-90.  As  for  more  recent  changes,  admittedly  they  were  influenced  by  international
discussions on governance, but they still did not break the status logic we identify as central to
the French network. Although the French interlocking network  has become less dense and
more dual, many of its distinctive characteristics still hold. These idiosyncrasies can be seen
as both symptoms and consequences of a structure that, in spite of the shocks of World War II
and the 1990s, has remained in place for more than 150 years. 
This core-periphery structure,  with its specific  mix of density and hierarchy,  has emerged
from the  coexistence  of  distinct  mechanisms.  The  governance logic is  certainly  the  most
intuitive; when one changes the way boards are composed, the interlocking networks evolve
mechanically. Still, this logic seems to have had little long-lasting influence on the structure.
In retrospect, it only played an important role in the 1937-56 period, where it can explain the
weakening of the network. The logic of business group building had a more continual effect
on the network,  even though we exemplified it  for only two specific  moments:  1937 and
1990. This logic, which could either be set up by families or the government, has its roots in
the creation of local solidarity networks based on interlocks rather than ownership. However,
the most important logic explaining the development of the French interlocking network from
the mid-19th century onwards is status logic. It has played a role in each and every period in
several  ways.  High-status  firms  (as  defined  by  different  dimensions  of  status)  tended  to
interlock with each other, lower-status firms tried to interlock with them, and firms tried to
put high-status directors on their board, a practice that created bridging network specialists
who were often pantoufleurs. These three mechanisms prevailed throughout the 20th Century.
Even the dramatic changes that occurred in the network in the 1940s and’50s, and then again
in the 1990s, were not caused by a weakening of these mechanisms, on the contrary, they can
be  explained  by  their  continuing  activation  in  a  changing  context.  The  two  moments  of
disruption of the network did not, however, have the same causes. In the 1940s and 1950s,
this  disruption  was  mainly  brought  about  by  the  new  role  of  the  State  and  changes  in
governance principles, while in the 1990s, the growth of firms was the responsible for the
radicalization  of  its  core-periphery  structure.  At  that  time,  the  firms  at  the  center  of  the
network became bigger and bigger and therefore increasingly isolated from the smaller firms
standing at the periphery.  At the same time this periphery was reshuffled by the arrival of
firms that were previously much smaller, but which had gone public in order to sustain their
spectacular growth.
It  is  only possible  to  tackle the peculiarities  of French capitalism if  we bring these three
mechanisms together. In particular, the role of the State in forging this form of capitalism
should be understood as only one part, among others, of the more general status logic. State-
owned firms often were part  of the high-status class, and high-status directors often were
former  civil  servants.  With  this  interpretation,  French  capitalism  is  not  so  much  State
capitalism as  it  is  Status  capitalism – the State  is  not  the cornerstone  of  French specific
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characteristics, but one version among others of a broader mechanism. Moreover, it is only
through  the  combination  of  these  three  mechanisms  that  a  proper  understanding  of  the
development of the network can be reached. The  pantoufleurs, in the status logic, provide
bridges between denser quasi-cliques  that are created,  in different sectors and at  different
times, by attempts at concentration by means other than ownership. Ties forged by business
groups  and  status  acting  together,  produce  a  large  and  dense  core.  Shifting  logics  of
governance only change the strength and density of these two kinds of ties, such that the
network evolves, while its structure and underlying mechanisms endure. 
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We present here the data used for the study of the French case. We first present the way we
defined our sample of firms (1.), then the way we defined directors and executives (2.). We then
explain the coding of the main variables that we used in our chapter (3.) and give alll our precise
results (4.), except overall network indicators (those also computed for other countries), that are
stored in a separate file.
1. Firms
According to the general principles defined by Thomas David and Gerharda Westerhuis in order
to insure comparability between countries, we have selected the ca. 50 biggest French financial
and the ca. 200 biggest French non-financial firms for each benchmark date. Due to constraints
in our sources, we however departed from studies on other countries by always choosing share
capital as our sampling criterion. Other minor peculiarities of our sampling scheme are explained
below.
Sources.  We  used  homogeneous  sources  to  gather  our  data  for  our  seven  cohorts,  namely
directories used by investors in order to get systematic informations about firms they could
invest in. These directories generally do not give any precise date for information on board
members;  however,  dates  are  given  for  information  on  results  and  stock  prices.  We
considered that the date for information on board members was likely to be the same as the
last date for information on results and prices. The sources and benchmark years used in our
dataset is listed in Table 1. While the exact title of the source and name of the publisher
changed, it  is actually the same publication that we followed throughout its history, thus
insuring  better  comparability,  although  the  exact  data  published  changed  between
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benchmark years. Exact dates were chosen according to the availability of the source or of
already partly coded datasets. 
Table 1 – Benchmark years and sources
Benchmark year Source
1911 Annuaire Desfossés. Paris: E. Desfossés et Fabre frères, 1913.
1928 Annuaire Desfossés. Paris:  E. Desfossés et Fabre frères, 1929.
1937 Annuaire Desfossés. Paris:  E. Desfossés et Fabre frères, 1936.
1956 Annuaire Desfossés. Paris: Société d'éditions économiques et financières, 1957.
1979 Annuaire Desfossés. Paris: Société d'éditions économiques et financières, 1980.
1990 Annuaire  des  sociétés  et  des  administrateurs. Paris:  Documentation  analyse
financière société anonyme, 1991
2000 Annuaire DAFSA des sociétés. Paris: COFISEM, 2001
 Size criterion. We chose share capital (capital social) as our threshold to identify the biggest
firms. Share capital differs from market capitalization. It is simply the number of shares
multiplied by the nominal price of shares (not their actual price on the market at a given
date).  It  of course is not necessarily  correlated with the number of employees or the
amount of sales or assets. We chose it because it was the only indicator that was available
in our sources for all dates and allow to build a 200+50 sample – and even failed to find a
source allowing to do this for a date around 2010. 
 Listed firms. We chose to focus on listed firms only, and on those firms which were list on
the Paris stock exchange. Listed firms do not include some important corporations that
chose not to get public (arguably few, however, contrary to what is commonly said); they
however include firms that were not in the corporate form (mostly sociétés en commandite,
i.e. limited partnerships). We only included firms listed in the Paris stock exchange for
their  shares  (not  for  bonds  only,  not  in  regional  stock  exchanges  only).  However,  a
handful of additional firms were included in the 1937-2000 samples while not being listed
and, in some cases, without any indication of their share capital, in order to reflect the
importance of some State-owned firms,  e.g. SNCF (railways) or EDF (electricity). Note
that these firms were still present in our sources, with lists of their board members and
information on most of our other variables.
 Foreign  firms.  Our general  principle  is  that  we  focused  on  the  French  firms,  and  we
excluded foreign firms. We included firms that had their headquarters in French colonies
for 1911, 1928 and 1937, but not for 1956 (Indochina, Algeria and Tunisia already being
independent or well in the process of independence). Apart from these limit cases (and
that of two firms located in Monaco), we did not include firms that were incorporated
under foreign law and/or had their headquarters in foreign countries, be they listed in
Paris or not. We included a few subsidiaries of foreign firms (e.g. Ford SAF) when they
had a clearly separate corporate identity under the French law and were listed separately.
 Financial and non-financial firms. We did not exclude any economic sector from our analysis.
The distinction between financial and non-financial firms was of a crucial importance in
order to define our population. It has proved difficult to draw this boundary. We decided
on holding companies on a case by case basis. The other problematic choice had to do
with real estate firms. We considered that those that mostly made profit out of rents were
non-financial, while when their profits mostly relied on financial leasing (crédit-bail), they
were  financial.  Our  financial  sector  thus  includes,  in  addition  to  banks  of  all  sorts,
20
insurance companies, financial leasing companies and portfolio companies (investment
funds).  This assessment of  the financial  character of each firm, as well  as  our sector
classification, is based on the detailed purpose of the firms as given by our source, which,
for 1990 and 2000, generally include shares of sales or profits by type of activity, but gave
less details for other dates. We however used the explicit statement of the purpose of the
firm, not the sector definitions that the source itself put forward.
For most of the cohorts (with the exception of 1928 and 1937), the threshold for share
capital of financial firms was at least as high as that of non financial firms.
 Subsidiaries. One of the problems we had to deal with in order to define our samples of
firms had to do with the identification of corporate groups,  i.e. firms that were listed
separately in the stock exchange, but which belonged to the same group, with strong
ownership ties.  Until  the 1990 cohort,  almost no information was available about the
shareholders of firms. For the earlier cohorts (1911 to 1979), we thus considered that,
unless  explicit  information about their  belonging to the same group was given,  listed
firms were independent firms. When we had more information, i.e.  for 1990 and 2000,
we decided that firm A and firm B were the same firms (hence only one of them should
be sampled, the other being a subsidiary) if 1) A owned more than 50% of B and 2) The
activity of the B represented more than 70% of that of A. In this case, we kept the that
was most directly involved in the productive process (e.g., for 2000, we kept Axa and left
Finaxa).
This choice is likely to have led us to include de facto subsidiaries in our sample, especially for
2000, when corporate borders became more and more blurry. It should be pointed out that as we
measure a drop in network density from 1990 to 2000, this choice is conservative. Should less
subsidiaries be included, the drop would probably be even sharper.
 The total number of sample firms is given in Table 2. Exact numbers are not always 50 and
200 since, for some cohorts,  a large number number firms had the exact same share
capital. For 1928, for example, if we had decided to select the next non-financial firm, we
would have had to include 30 additional firms. 
Table 2 – Number of firms in our samples
       
 1911 1928 1937 1956 1979 1990 2000
Total 245 236 241 255 247 252 250
Financial 45 51 52 56 53 52 50
Non Financial 200 185 189 199 194 200 200
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2. Directors 
 Positions included in our dataset.  While the exact names of positions varied a lot between
firms, especially before World War II, we generally included all board members (members
of  the  conseil  d’administration,  that  had  a  quite  flexible  role,  more or  less  executive  or
control-like, depending on firms), plus the two or three top executives, even when the
source did not clearly include them in the board. These were mostly CEOs (présidents-
directeurs généraux) and managing directors (directeurs généraux), plus a handful of  gérants in
limited partnerships and the like. In the few cases when we found them, we included
censeurs,  but we excluded pure functions  of  control  like  those of  government officers
(commissaires du gouvermenent) and external auditors (commissaires aux comptes) – even though,
among the latter, prominent interlockers were to be found in the interwar period, along
with  professional  accountants.  We  also  excluded  secretaries  of  the  board  (secretaries
généraux),  although that function also mixed professional  female secretaries and young
ambitious executives.
 Executive  positions.  As  government  practices  changed  during  our  period,  our  coding
schemes were modified accordingly, especially following Joly 2009. For 1911 and 1937,
we included the following in executive positions: president or vice-president of the board,
administrateur délégué,  directeur,  directeur général,  sous-directeur,  sous-gouverneur, gérant, associé. For
1928, we had no data on exact positions. For 1956, a transition period between two types
of  governance,  we  included:  président-directeur  général,  vice-président  directeur  général,
administrateur  délégué,  directeur,  directeur  général,  directeur  général  adjoint,  sous-gouverneur,  gérant,
associé and, only for those firms that had neither président-directeur général nor directeur général,
we added presidents and vice-presidents of  boards. For 1979, 1990 and 2000, we only
included:  président-directeur  général,  vice-président  directeur  général,  directeur,  directeur  général,
directeur général adjoint, président du directoire, gouverneur, sous-gouverneur, gérant, associé. 
In Table 4 below, we give numbers of unique persons for categories such as “non executive
directors in finance”. As the same individual could both be e.g. an executive in a financial firm
and a non-executive director in a non-financial firm, we had to use priority rules. We considered
that any person who was an exective in a financial firm should be classified as such; among the
others,  those  with  executive  positions  are  classified  as  “executive,  non finance”;  among the
others,  those with non executive positions in financial  firms are classified as “non executive,
finance”; the residual category therefore include directors who only had non executive positions
in non-financial firms.
 Identification of interlockers.  An under-discussed aspect of interlocking directorates research
is the fact that it is based on an identification of people from lists. How do we know that
it was the same Pierre Durand who sat on two different boards? Such problems with
onomastics are enhanced when the source only gives initials instead of first names, which
was  the  case  of  ours  for  the  1911  to  1979  benchmark  dates.  For  later  cohorts,  the
inclusion of first names minimized the problem. For 1937, 1956 and 1979, our source
also included an annex where directors, with their first names and their positions, were
listed in alphabetical  order. We used it  to identify interlockers,  which leads to almost
100% accuracy.  We  however  did  not  have  such information  for  the  1911  and 1928
benchmark dates, and, in many cases, we only had the names of directors, not even an
initial. We therefore gave each individual two different identification numbers. The first
one, that we used in our calculations, is likely to over-estimate interlocking: we considered
that any people with the same name and initials/first names that were compatible were in
fact the same person (e.g. “P. Durand” and two “Durand” without initial were in fact one
person). The second one was slightly more conservative. We considered that two people
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with the same name and initial were the same person, but, when we only had a name, we
created a different identification numbers for each position (e.g. “P. Durand” and two
“Durand” without initial were three different persons). A still more conservative coding
scheme would have considered e.g. that three “P. Durand” were three different persons,
but we considered it very likely.
It is  therefore possible that we over-estimated interlocks for 1911 and 1928. A test with our
second coding strategy lead to a density of 4.3 in 1911 and 4.6 in 1928: quite lower than that
based on the first coding scheme, but with the same trend between the two periods and between
1928 and 1937. The same is true for average degree, with 10.4 and 10.6. Degree centralization
would be 12.6% and 15.7%, which would change the trend from 1928 to 1937, that we therefore
did not interpret. We do not think that our coding choices had an impact on the lists of firms and
persons  with  a  high  degree,  on  homophily  statistics  or  correlations  between  degrees  and
attributes of firms.
3. Variables
We systematically gathered and coded data on many attributes of firms. Those that we used in
our chapter attributes are the following: 
 Sector. As we have explained before, the assessment of the sector of each firm is based on
the detailed purpose of the firms as given by our sources, which, for 1990 and 2000,
generally include shares of sales or profit by type of activity, but are less detailed for other
dates.  For  the  financial  sector,  we  were  not  able,  on  the  basis  of  our  source,  to
differentiate  universal banks  from commercial  banks and investment  banks.  We have
defined two levels of coding, listed in Table 3. Every firm is coded in one and only one
sector. Most of our chapter relies on wide sectors, but we defined institutional investors
as everything in the financial sector that was not a bank, and we give precise sectors in the
online list of firms.
Table 3: Economic sectors
Finance Insurance
 Bank
 Real estate investment fund
 Investment fund
 Other
Energy Oil and Gas
 Petrochemical industry
 Coal
 Electricity
 Electrochemistry
 Other
Transportation and utilities Urban facilities
 Railroads
 Shipping
 Canals/transportation on rivers
 Aircraft – Transportation
 Other
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Mechanical industries and eletronics Automotive industry
 Aircraft – construction
 Weaponry
 Electric facilities
 Other mechanical industries
 Electronics and computers
 Consulting
Building and public works Building and public works
Real estate
Other consumer goods Pharmaceutical
 Luxury
 Hotels
 Food
 Retail
 Media
 Other
Heavy Industry Mines (except coal)
 Steel and Iron
 Textile
 Paper
 Chemical industry (other than pharmaceutical)
 Other
 
 Level  of  share capital.  For each cohort,  we split  the population in three categories:   the
lowest quartile of the distribution of the share capital of the cohort; the highest quartile
and the medium quartiles. In order to translate levels of share capital into 2003 euros, we
used  online  data  provided  by  the  French  Institute  of  Statistics  at
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/calcul-pouvoir-achat.asp  ? (valid  URL,  February  14,
2013).
 Location. As for the  location of headquarters, Paris was defined as including the whole
former Seine department, i.e. the departments of Paris, Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis
and Val-de-Marne. 
 Age.  We computed the  age of the firm based on the date of creation reported in the
source (not that of the transformation into a corporation, last merger, change of name,
etc.).
 Presence in other cohorts. We took the time needed to identify firms that changed names,
were  merged,  etc.  as  the  same  firm,  based  on  creation  dates,  activities,  and  various
sources, included business history literature, Wikipedia, websites of the firms, websites of
share collectors, etc.  Because of such heterogeneous sources and of complex cases of
mergers, identifications cannot be 100% accurate, but we are confident that they are of a
very good quality.
 State-owned firms.  We mostly used lists of firms that became State-owned through laws
after 1944 and 1981, then were returned to the private sector after 1986; most of the
relevant information is presented in Chabanas and Vergeau 1996. Our source also often
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explicitly  mentioned  State-ownership.  For  1990  and  2000,  the  source  also  gave  us
information on the main shareholders. We considered that firms were State-owned when
the first shareholder was the State and it held at least one third of the shares.
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4. Results
Table 4: Description of the samples of firms
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1911 1928 1937 1956 1979 1990 2000
N 245 236 241 255 247 252 250
Created 0-5 years before - % 14 12 3 6 0 4 NA
Created +20 years before - % 52 61 71 86 81 84 NA
Corporation - % 94 98 98 93 94 NA NA
State-owned firms - % 0 0 0 9 7 10 3
Present in the previous cohort - % NA 43 64 38 42 59 40
Present in the next cohort - % 41 65 40 41 60 40 NA
Headquarters in Paris - % 85 79 77 83 84 83 78
N
um
be
r 
of
 fi
rm
s Finance 45 51 52 56 53 52 50
Energy 28 52 71 21 10 11 6
Transportation & Utilities 73 38 34 19 18 15 12
Mechanical 17 19 16 53 41 45 49
Building 8 4 3 7 41 42 22
Consumer goods 23 24 19 30 43 59 88
Heavy industries 51 46 46 10 41 28 23
Finance 18 22 22 22 21 21 20
Energy 11 22 30 8 4 4 2
Transportation & Utilities 30 16 14 7 7 6 5
Mechanical 7 8 7 21 17 18 20
Building 3 2 1 3 17 17 9
Consumer goods 9 10 8 12 17 23 35
Heavy industries 21 20 19 27 17 11 9
Mini Capital (M€) Sample 20.4 15.6 14.4 12.2 22.0 20.3 13.9
Maxi Capital (M€) Sample 1417.3 259.3 301.9 404.8 1383.3 2281.7 10741.3
Gini Index Capital Sample 0.55 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.65 0.79
Finance 70.8 52.0 28.8 27.5 103.3 148.6 63.7
Energy 37.5 52.0 57.6 39.0 79.6 346.6 127.9
Transportation & Utilities 50.9 37.7 48.0 46.6 33.1 44.6 52.9
Mechanical 34.0 31.2 54.0 35.2 45.9 40.9 59.0
Building 56.6 27.0 48.0 25.6 68.0 50.2 125.8
Consumer goods 34.0 36.1 43.2 30.8 47.0 61.0 45.7
Heavy industries 42.5 39.0 48.0 46.5 93.3 45.0 38.7
Sample 48.1 39.0 48 34.4 70.0 71.8 61.1
Sample 2444 2756 2980 2538 2975 3010 2590
Sample – executives 413 NA 607 348 370 470 260
Sample – non-executives 2031 NA 2373 2190 2605 2540 2330
Financial firms 544 678 730 605 722 666 603
Financial firms – executives 76 NA 136 76 75 97 45
Financial firms – non-executives 468 NA 594 529 647 569 558
Non-financial firms 1900 2078 2250 1933 2253 2344 1987
Non-financial firms – executives 337 NA 471 272 295 373 215
Non-financial firms – non-executives 1563 NA 1779 1661 1958 1971 1772
Sample 1578 1809 1816 1846 2050 2087 2005
Sample – executives 325 NA 448 320 352 449 249
Sample – non-executives 1253 NA 1368 1526 1698 1638 1755
Financial firms 408 555 512 484 507 493 495
Financial firms – executives 67 NA 124 72 72 96 41
Financial firms – non-executives 341 NA 388 412 435 397 454
Non-financial firms 1170 1254 1304 1362 1543 1594 1509
Non-financial firms – executives 258 NA 324 248 280 353 208
Non-financial firms – non-executives 912 NA 980 1114 1263 1241 1301
Average board Average size, incl. executives and non-executives 10.0 11.8 12.4 10.0 12.0 11.9 10.4
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Table 5: Homophily statistics
Internal density of subnetworks (dichotomized). Stars indicate that the density is significantly 
higher (* and bold number) or lower (* and number in italics) than that of a sub-network of 
the same size, sampled in the complete network – p<0.05.
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1911 1928 1937 1956 1979 1990 2000
Complete network 4.9 5.4 6.3 2.7 4.7 5.0 2.6
Finance 9.3* 8.9* 11.8* 5* 12.9* 11.5* 5.7*
Non-Finance 4.5 5.1 6.1 2.5 3.4* 4* 2.3*
Energy 4.8 8.7* 10.3* 9.5* 13.3* 5.5 13.3*
Transportation/Utilities 8.4* 12.9* 11.2* 2.3 9.2* 8.6 4.5
Mechanics/Elec 5.1 4.7 12.5* 4* 4 3.3 2.6
Building/Real Estate 7.1 0 0 0 9.8* 7.9* 5.6*
Consumption Goods 0.8* 2.5 5.3 1.2* 3.5 6.1 2.5
Heavy Industries 6.1 6.1 7.4 4.2* 8.2* 6.9 3.6
State-owned NA NA NA 10* 18.4* 16.3* 23.8*
Present before NA 8.9* 7.3* 5.1* 7.1* 6* 7.8*
High Share Capital 13.5* 10.9* 13.6* 5.2* 13.1* 13.1* 14.5*
Low Share Capital 2.3* 3.1* 3.6* 1.9 2.3* 2.6* 0.4*
Paris 5.5* 6.5* 7.5* 3* 5.4* 5.6* 3.5*
Outside Paris 3.4 3.8 6.8 2.9 1.9* 3.2 1.2*
Table 6: Centrality statistics
Average centrality degree (Freeman index), dichotomized networks.
Table 7: Density among firms that stay in our sample
Internal density of subnetworks (dichotomized). For each couple of dates, the only firms that
are taken into account are those that were present in the sample at both dates.
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1911 7.4
1928 8.9
1928 7.6
1937 7.3
1937 7.1
1956 5.1
1956 3.6
1979 7.1
1979 5.4
1990 6
1990 7.5
2000 7.8
1911 1928 1937 1956 1979 1990 2000
Complete network 12 12.6 15.1 7.0 11.6 12.4 6.6
Finance 15.0 14.5 17.1 8.3 18.6 17.6 8.8
Non-Finance 11.3 12.1 14.5 6.7 9.7 11.1 6.0
Energy 12.2 13.4 16.6 7.6 12.9 10.4 8.3
Transportation/Utilities 14.9 17.5 20.0 6.3 12.4 12.7 7.1
Mechanics/Elec 9.6 12.6 12.6 7.0 7.3 7.4 5.1
Building/Real Estate 6.6 4.2 11.7 5.7 23.0 11.6 7.5
Consumption Goods 2.9 5.7 4.8 3.5 5.9 12.7 5.6
Heavy Industries 10.7 10.0 12.2 7.5 12.0 12.4 6.7
State-owned NA NA NA 7.7 9.9 15.5 9.6
Present Before NA 15.3 17.2 9.5 13.2 13.7 11.0
High Share Capital 18.6 16.7 21.0 9.1 16.9 19.0 14.1
Low Share Capital 7.3 8.8 11.1 5.1 6.1 8.7 2.1
Paris 12.6 13.7 16.3 7.3 12.5 13.3 7.5
Outside Paris 8.1 7.7 11.4 5.5 7.2 9.1 3.4
